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Abstract 
 
We examined whether speech-related differences between truth tellers and liars are more 
profound when answering unexpected questions than when answering expected questions. 
We also examined whether the presence of an interpreter affected these results. In the 
experiment, 204 participants from the USA (Hispanic participants only), Russia, and the 
Republic of Korea were interviewed in their native language by a native-speaking interviewer 
or by a British interviewer through an interpreter. Truth tellers discussed a trip they had made 
during the last twelve months; liars fabricated a story about such a trip. The key dependent 
variables were the amount of information provided and the proportion of all statements that 
were complications. The proportion of complications distinguished truth tellers from liars 
better when answering unexpected than expected questions, but only in interpreter-absent 
interviews. The number of details provided did not differ between truth tellers and liars or 
between interpreter-absent and interpreter-present interviews. 
 
 
Keywords: interpreter, non-native speakers, expected vs unexpected questions, information- 
gathering, deception 
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Using Unexpected Questions  
to Elicit Information and Cues to Deceit in Interpreter-Based Interviews 
Meta-analyses have shown that truth tellers and liars differ from each other in terms 
of speech content, but that these differences are usually small (DePaulo et al., 2003; DePaulo 
& Morris, 2004; Vrij, 2008). Therefore, around a decade ago, researchers started to examine 
whether verbal differences between truth tellers and liars could be elicited or enhanced 
through theory-based interview methods (Vrij & Granhag, 2012, 2014). One strand of this 
research is called cognitive lie detection and involves three key elements: Imposing cognitive 
load, encouraging interviewees to say more, and asking unexpected questions (Vrij, Fisher, & 
Blank, 2017; Vrij, Leal, Mann, Vernham, & Brankaert, 2015). Cognitive lie detection appears 
to elicit cues to deception (Vrij, Fisher, Blank, Leal, & Mann, 2016) and to facilitate lie 
detection (Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017). In the current experiment, we elaborate on the asking 
unexpected questions element.  
 A consistent finding in the deception literature is that liars prepare themselves for 
interviews by preparing answers to questions they expect to be asked (Hartwig, Granhag, & 
Strömwall, 2007; see Tedeschini (2012) for a description of a real-world case). This strategy 
of preparing answers for possible questions makes sense. Planning makes lying easier and 
planned lies typically contain fewer cues to deceit than spontaneous lies (DePaulo et al., 
2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006). However, preparing for answers will be fruitful only if liars 
correctly anticipate which questions will be asked. Investigators can thus thwart liars’ 
preparations by asking questions that liars do not anticipate. Liars should have more difficulty 
than truth tellers in answering the unexpected questions as they have to produce spontaneous 
answers to these questions. As a result, liars’ answers may be less detailed than truth tellers’ 
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answers when answering unexpected questions. Liars may have an easier task, and hence 
provide more detailed answers, if they are asked questions that they are prepared for. In 
support of the unexpected-questions approach, it has been found that more pronounced 
differences between truth tellers and liars appeared in answers to unexpected questions than 
in answers to expected questions (Roos af Hjelmsäter, Ohman, Granhag, & Vrij, 2014; 
Sooniste, Granhag, Knieps, & Vrij, 2013; Vrij et al., 2009; Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, Jundi, & 
Granhag, 2012).  
 Most of the studies examining the unexpected questions approach used a generic 
measure: Total amount of information. In the present experiment, we break down this generic 
measure (total amount of information) into components that we believe are more sensitive to 
the different verbal strategies used by truth tellers and liars. In brief, we expected truth tellers 
to provide stories that include non-essential details that make the story more complex 
(complications). By comparison, we expected liars to provide details that are based on 
common knowledge, or to justify why they cannot provide certain types of information (self-
handicapping strategies).  
 A complication is a reported activity or event that was not expected or planned (“The 
event was cancelled due to bad weather”) (Steller & Köhnken, 1989; Vrij, Leal, et al., 2017). 
Complications are more likely to occur in truthful statements than in deceptive statements 
(Amado et al., 2015; Vrij et al., 2017). Making up complications requires imagination and 
liars may not have adequate imagination to make up facts (Vrij, 2008). In addition, liars 
prefer to keep their stories simple (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007) but adding 
complications makes the story more complex.  
 Common knowledge details refer to strongly invoked stereotypical information about 
events (“We visited the Louvre museum where was saw the Mona Lisa”) (Vrij, Leal, et al., 
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2017). Liars are more likely to include common knowledge details in their statements than 
truth tellers (Köhnken, 2004; Sporer, 2016; Volbert & Steller, 2014; Vrij, Leal, et al., 2017). 
Truth tellers, who have personal experiences of an event, are likely to report such unique 
experiences, and when they do so the statement is no longer scripted. If liars do not have 
personal experiences of the event they report, they then will draw upon general knowledge to 
construe the event.  Even if they have personal experiences of the event, they may not report 
them due to their desire to keep their stories simple.  
 Self-handicapping strategies relate to an admission of not being able to provide 
information followed by a justification (“I can’t remember, it was a while ago when this 
happened”, “Nothing unexpected happened, I am a very organised person”) (Vrij, Leal, et al., 
2017). Liars are more likely to include self-handicapping strategies in their statements than 
truth tellers (Vrij, Leal, et al., 2017). For liars, who are inclined to keep stories simple, not 
having to provide information is an attractive strategy. However, liars are also concerned 
about their credibility and believe that admitting lack of knowledge and/or memory appears 
suspicious (Ruby & Brigham, 1998). A potential solution is to provide a justification for the 
inability to provide information. Note that the justification is crucial for a self- handicapping 
strategy. The statement ‘I can’t remember’ itself is not a self-handicapping strategy, it is 
called admitting lack of memory and part of the Criteria-Based Content Analysis tool 
(Amado et al., 2015). 
 Examining complications, common knowledge details and self-handicapping 
strategies has two advantages compared to examining total details.  First, the three separate 
measures should be more effective than the one, combined measure (total details) in 
discriminating truth tellers from liars. Both truth tellers and liars must provide some details in 
interviews, with truth tellers perhaps providing somewhat more total details than liars. 
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However, the combined measure is composed of some details that are more likely to be 
reported by truth tellers (complications), but other details that are more likely to be reported 
by liars (common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies). Combining the three 
separate measures into one overall score should therefore dilute the diagnostic value of each 
measure taken separately. Second, we could examine the proportion of cues to truthfulness, 
i.e. the proportion of complications (complications / (complications + common knowledge 
details + self-handicapping strategies), which is a within-subjects measure. Within-subjects 
measures are preferred by practitioners (Vrij, 2016) and scholars (Nahari & Pazuelo, 2015; 
Nahari & Vrij, 2014; Nahari, in press), amongst other reasons, because it creates the 
opportunity to design cut-off scores rules (e.g., “A statement is considered to be truthful 
when it has more complications than common knowledge details and self-handicapping 
strategies combined”).  
 This difference in effectiveness between the total detail variable and the proportion of 
complications variable may occur particularly in answering unexpected questions. Liars have 
no option other than to report spontaneous answers to the unexpected questions and 
spontaneous questions in particular may lack complications and may include common 
knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies.   
The use of an Interpreter 
 Interpreters are frequently used in investigative interviews but experimental research 
examining their effect on eliciting information and cues to deceit is scarce. We are aware of 
only six experimental studies published in this area (Ewens et al., 2016a, b, c, 2017; Houston, 
Russano,  & Ricks, 2017; Vrij, Leal et al., 2017, in press). A consistent finding in these 
experiments is that when interviewees speak in their own language through an interpreter, 
fewer details are provided than when interviewees speak in their own language without an 
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interpreter (Ewens et al., 2016a, b, c, 2017; Vrij, Leal, et al., 2017). Ewens et al. (2016b) 
found evidence for two explanations. First, interpreters did not translate every detail the 
interviewee gave. The interpreters implemented a long consecutive style of interpretation in 
which the interpreter translated segments of talk, a style frequently used in interviews 
(Viezzi, 2012), including in intelligence interviews (Department of the Army, 2006). 
Remembering all the details an interviewee conveys is difficult in such a situation and the 
interpreters failed to translate about 10% of the details given by the interviewees. Second, 
interviewees actually reporteded less with an interpreter present (Ewens et al., 2016b). 
Perhaps the interpreter’s interruptions disrupted the interviewee’s train of thought and made 
memory retrieval more difficult (Vrij, Hope, & Fisher, 2014; Nelson & Goodmon, 2003) or 
perhaps the interviewees decided to be concise when an interpreter was present given the 
extra time it takes to communicate through an interpreter (similar to people being more 
concise when talking to a hard-of-hearing person).  
 We explored the effect of an interpreter on complications, common knowledge details 
and self-handicapping strategies. Vrij, Leal, et al. (2017) found no effect of an interpreter on 
these variables, which suggest that examining them could be equally effective for lie 
detection purposes in interpreter-absent and interpreter-present interviews. However, we do 
not recommend practitioners and policy makers to rely on the findings of a single study, also 
because we cannot rule out at this stage that some of these variables could be affected by the 
presence of an interviewer. That is, perhaps interviewees are inclined to be more concise in 
the presence of an interpreter, which could result in fewer complications and more common 
knowledge details. Or perhaps interpreters leave out complications and replace them with 
common knowledge details in their translations. Or perhaps interpreter-present interviews 
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give interviewees more time to think when the interpreter translates a response, which could 
result in fewer common knowledge details.  
Hypotheses 
 Truth tellers will report more details, more complications, fewer common knowledge 
details and fewer self-handicapping strategies than liars (Hypothesis 1a). From Hypothesis 1a 
follows that the proportion of cues to truthfulness (e.g., proportion of complications) will be 
higher in truth tellers than in liars (Hypothesis 1b). The differences between truth tellers and 
liars predicted in Hypothesis 1a, b will be more pronounced when answering unexpected 
questions than when answering expected questions (Hypothesis 2). The proportion of 
complications will be more effective in discriminating truth tellers from liars than total 
details, particularly when answering unexpected questions (Hypothesis 3). Less information 
will be provided in interviewer-absent than in interviewer-present interviews (Hypothesis 4). 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 204 participants (52 males, 147 females and five not indicated) took part in 
the study. All participants were university students and their age ranged from 18-39 years 
with an average age of M = 22.00 years (SD = 3.44). Participation took place in three 
different universities in the Republic of Korea, Russia and USA, and the background of the 
participants was Korean (n = 80), Russian (n = 79) and Hispanic (n = 45), respectively.  
Procedure 
 The study consisted of two parts. The first part related to the unexpected – expected 
questions, the topic of this paper. The second part related to the effect of sketching when 
narrating on eliciting information and cues to deceit (Vrij et al., in press). The two parts are 
independent from each other (i.e., the sketching manipulation was introduced after the 
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unexpected – expected questions part of the study) and the findings are therefore reported in 
two different papers.  
Procedure 
 Recruitment, pre-condition selection form, preparation and pre-interview 
questionnaire.  
 We used the same procedure as Vrij, Leal, et al. (2017). Participants were recruited 
via an advert on the university intranets and advertisement leaflets. The advert explained that 
the experiment would require participants to tell the truth or lie about a trip away that they 
may (or may not) have taken within the last year. We decided upon “last year” so that truth 
tellers would still remember many details about their trip and liars could not easily say ‘I 
can’t remember’ when answering the questions.  On arrival to the corresponding university, 
participants received a participant information sheet and signed an informed consent form. 
They then completed a pre-condition selection form that contained six cities that the 
researchers thought the participants may have visited during the past year. (Different cities 
were used for the three different countries.) The participants were also asked to write down 
the names of two other cities they had visited during the past year.  
For each city the participants indicated (a) whether they had been there during the last 
twelve months, (b) when they had been there during the last twelve months, (c) for how long 
they stayed there, and (d) whether they have lived there. For truth tellers the experimenter 
selected a city where the participant had stayed during the last twelve months for at least two 
nights but had never lived there. Truth tellers were informed that they would be interviewed 
about this selected city (city X) and asked to answer the questions truthfully. For liars, the 
experimenter selected a city where the participant had never been in his/her life before. Liars 
were informed that they would be interviewed about city X (taken from the list of cities truth 
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tellers were interviewed about) and that they had to pretend to have stayed there for at least 
two nights during a trip made during the last twelve months. Across all 102 truth tellers, more 
than twenty cities were used. Liars were also interviewed about these cities.  
Truth tellers and liars were then left with a computer with internet access and told 
they had twenty minutes to prepare for their interview, or to inform the experimenter if they 
were ready before that time. The participants were told that they were allowed to make notes 
while doing their research. Truth tellers and liars were told that it was important to be 
convincing because, if they did not appear convincing, they would be asked to write a 
statement about what they told the interviewer in the interview. In a pre-interview 
questionnaire (which was translated in the native language of the participant) the truth tellers 
and liars rated their thoroughness of preparation via three items: (1) shallow to (7) thorough; 
(1) insufficient to (7) sufficient; and (1) poor to (7) good. The answers to the three questions 
were averaged (Cronbach’s alpha = .81) and the variable is called ‘preparation thoroughness’. 
They were also asked whether they thought they were given enough time to prepare 
themselves with the following question: ‘Do you think the amount of time you were given to 
prepare was: (1) insufficient to (7) sufficient.  
Experimental conditions. 
Participants were allocated randomly to one of the four experimental cells. A total of 
102 participants were allocated to the truth condition and 102 to the lie condition; and 101 to 
the Interpreter-absent condition and 103 to the Interpreter-present condition.  
In total, three interpreters were used in the study, one in each country. These were the 
same interpreters as used in Vrij, Leal, et al. (2017). The Korean and Hispanic interpreters 
were professional interpreters; the Russian interpreter spoke fluent English and had a Masters 
degree that included English language. The interpreters used a long consecutive interpreter 
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style: They interpreted chunks of information uttered by the participant rather than 
interpreting sentence by sentence, and took notes during the interview.  
 In the interpreter condition, one British interviewer was used, whereas in the non-
interpreter condition one Russian, one Korean and one Hispanic interviewer were used. The 
British, Russian and Korean interviewers were the same as in Vrij, Leal, et al. (2017). Prior to 
the experiment the British interviewer (who is a very experienced interviewer and has 
interviewed in many experiments before) instructed the other interviewers how to conduct the 
interview. They were instructed to be friendly and not to interrupt the interviewee. Several 
practice sessions took place until the British interviewer was satisfied with the interview style 
of the interviewer. That is, she was satisfied with the demeanour of the interviewers 
(appeared friendly) and the opportunities they gave to the interviewees to talk (no 
interruptions). To assess consistency in interview style between the interpreter and non-
interpreter conditions, participants were asked to assess in a post-questionnaire the rapport 
they experienced with the interviewer.  
 The interview. 
Prior to the interview the experimenter told the interviewer about which city to 
interview the participant. The interviewer was unaware of the veracity status of the 
participant. To make the interviewee feel comfortable and to avoid floor effects in 
establishing rapport interviewees were offered a glass of water from the interviewer, as 
offering something helps rapport building (reciprocation principle, Cialdini, 2007).  
The interviewer started by saying: “I understand from my colleague that you have 
visited _________ I would now like to ask you some questions about this visit.” The 
interview contained five questions. Two questions about the actual trip we thought would be 
expected: “Could you please tell me in as much detail as possible everything you did when 
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you were at _________ from the moment you arrived to the moment you left?” (Question 1); 
“Could you please tell me in as much detail as possible about your accommodation where 
you stayed, including the location and address if you can remember, and what (tourist) 
attractions were nearby?” (Question 2). Three questions were asked about the planning of the 
trip which we thought to be unexpected: “Could you please tell me in as much detail as 
possible everything you did to plan this trip E.g., organising transport, accommodation, 
where to visit and so on.?” (Question 1), “Could you please talk us through the order of that 
planning? What did you plan first, second etc. and what was most important for you to 
organise correctly?” (Question 2) and “Could you please tell me in as much detail as possible 
if there was anything unexpected that happened or perhaps something that didn’t go to plan 
when organising this trip?” (Question 3). The questions about the actual trip and planning 
were counterbalanced, so that 100 participants were asked the two actual trip questions first 
and 104 participants were asked the three planning questions first. We examined the effect of 
Order on the main dependent variables (total details, complications, common knowledge 
details, self-handicapping strategies and proportion of complications) in a 2 (Veracity) x 2 
(Interpreter) x 2 (Order) MANOVA. At a multivariate level, none of the effects that included 
Order were significant, all F’s < 1.183, all p’s > .305. We therefore did not include Order as a 
factor in the subsequent analyses.  
The interviews were video (interviewees only) and audio recorded and the English 
speech in the audiotapes was subsequently transcribed. In other words, in the interpreter 
conditions the speech from the interpreter was transcribed and analysed. We did this because 
it is this speech that interviewers will understand in real life interviews with interpreters. In a 
study in which in the Interpreter-present interviews both the interviewee’s and interpreter’s 
speech were both transcribed, coded and analysed, virtual identical findings in the two data 
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sets emerged in terms of (i) eliciting information and (ii) the difference in reported details 
between truth tellers and liars (Ewens et al., 2016b). 
Post-interview questionnaire. 
The post-interview questionnaire was translated in the native language of the 
participant. Rapport was measured via the nine items Interaction Questionnaire (Vallano & 
Schreiber Compo, 2011).  Participants rated the interviewer on 7-point scales ranging from 
[1] not at all to [7] extremely on nine characteristics such as smooth, bored, engrossed, and 
involved (Cronbach’s alpha = .81). The post-questionnaire also measured participant’s 
motivation to perform well during the interview (with a single item). 
After questions about rapport and motivation, the two actual trip questions and three 
planning questions were listed. Participants reported for each of these five questions the 
extent to which they had expected these questions (on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 = 
not at all to 7 = totally). They were also asked to indicate the extent to which they told the 
truth in answering these questions on 11-point Likert scales ranging from 0% to 100%. 
Coding 
All coders were blind to the hypotheses and Veracity condition. 
 Detail.  
 The coders were taught the coding scheme by the first author who has more than 
twenty years of experience in coding details. A coder first read the transcripts and coded each 
detail in the interview. To give an example, the following answer contains ten details: “I have 
an aunt there, ah – living in a house close to the lake. We went in my truck, ah, five of us, 
also my sister's boyfriend and my boyfriend”. Each detail in the actual trip section and each 
detail in the planning of the trip section was coded only once; thus repetitions were not 
coded. The same detail reported in the actual trip section and in the planning section would 
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not be considered a repetition and would be coded twice, but this situation never occurred. A 
second coder coded a random sample of 40 transcripts. Inter-rater reliability between the two 
coders, using the two-way random effects model measuring consistency, was high (Single 
Measures ICC = .90). 
 Two coders coded independently from each other complications, common knowledge 
details and self-handicapping strategies. A complication is an activity or event that someone 
describes which was not expected or planned (Steller & Köhnken, 1989; Vrij, Leal, et al., 
2017). Three examples of complications are: i) “We couldn't stay at his place because he 
lived in dormitory”; ii) “Two weeks before the competition, I broke my jaw - I do figure 
skating- and they couldn't find any another person to go to the competition instead of me. So 
I had to go to this competition with my injury”, and iii) “The first night, we stayed at that 
guesthouse because my acquaintance worked there, and for the second night, we went to that 
hotel because we wanted to go there”.  
 Common knowledge details refer to strongly invoked stereotypical knowledge about 
events (Vrij, Leal, et al., 2017). Three examples of common knowledge details are: i) “And 
we just erm – er walked er around and saw this er medieval architecture which is like quite 
common for, er, different European cities”; ii) “And we also visited like a standard places 
like er the cathedral in Prague”, and iii) “I looked for information on the internet, ah where – 
and read some mm places to go”.  
 Self-handicapping strategies relate to an admission of not being able to provide 
information followed by a justification (Vrij, Leal, et al., 2017). Three examples of self-
handicapping strategies are: i) “I don't remember the, er, exact address, because I came there 
by er tourist minibus, so I – I didn't quite remember the city, because we weren't walking 
much”, ii) “We er travelled um together with my mum, er – and um, so the – the room wasn't 
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quite memorable for me, maybe also because there was like no er minibar there as it is in 
Russia” and iii) “For the guesthouse I didn't look for any information because (name city) is 
very famous, so I – I guess if I go there, there must be some places for me”.  
 Inter-rater reliability between the two coders, using the two-way random effects 
model measuring consistency, was high for complications (Average Measures, Intraclass 
correlation coefficient, ICC = .88) and self-handicapping strategies (Average Measures ICC = 
.81) and satisfactory for common knowledge details (Average Measures ICC = .66). 
Disagreements were resolved between the two coders. All disagreements occurred because 
one coder failed to spot a particular complication, common knowledge detail or self-
handicapping strategy. To calculate the proportion of complications a total score was 
computed (number of complications + number of common knowledge details + number of 
self-handicapping strategies) and the number of complications was divided by this total score. 
Scores > .50 indicate that the participants reported more complications than common 
knowledge details or self-handicapping strategies, whereas scores < .50 indicate that the 
participants reported more common knowledge details or self-handicapping strategies than 
complications. 
 Number of days spent away. 
 One coder also counted the number of days spent away the interviewees described in 
their interviews. A second coder coded a random sample of 40 transcripts. Inter-rater 
reliability between the two coders, using the two-way random effects model measuring 
consistency, was good (Single Measures ICC = .79). 
Results 
Preparation thoroughness and preparation time 
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 Two oneway ANOVAs with Veracity as factor and preparation thoroughness and 
preparation time as dependent variable revealed that truth tellers (M = 4.92, SD = 1.07, 95% 
CI [4.71, 5.1]) rated their preparation as more thorough than liars (M = 4.17, SD = 0.99, 95% 
CI [3.97, 4.37]), F(1, 202) = 26.82, p < .001, d = 0.73. Truth tellers (M = 5.93, SD = 1.49, 
95% CI [5.61, 6.26]) also believed more than liars (M = 4.93, SD = 1.79, 95% CI [4.61, 
5.25]) that they were given sufficient time to prepare themselves for the interview, F(1, 202) 
= 18.83, p < .001, d = 0.75. We introduced preparation thoroughness and preparation time as 
covariates in the hypotheses testing analyses.  
Manipulation Checks 
 Rapport.  
 An ANOVA with Interpreter as factor and rapport with the interviewer as dependent 
variable did not show a difference in rapport between the two conditions, F(1, 202) = 2.77, p 
= .097, d = 0.23. The grand mean revealed that the interviewees perceived the rapport with 
the interviewer as very good (M = 5.60, SD = .82 on a 7-point scale). 
 Expectedness of the questions. 
A 2 (Veracity: truth vs lie) X 2 (Interpreter: present vs absent) X 2 (Type of Question: 
planning vs actual trip) with Veracity and Interpreter as between-subjects factors and Type of 
Question as within-subjects factor revealed a main effect for Type of Question, F(1, 200) = 
180.90, p < .001, d = 1.04 (0.82,1.24). The questions about the actual trip were more 
expected (M = 5.02, SD = 1.34, 95% CI [4.83, 5.20]) than the questions about planning (M = 
3.57, SD = 1.43, 95% CI [3.37, 3.78]). All other effects were not significant, all F’s < 1.75, 
all p’s > .225. From now on we refer to expected questions when referring to the actual trip 
questions and to unexpected questions when referring to the planning questions.  
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Motivation, number of days spent away discussed, percentage truth telling in the 
interview, and time since the trip was made.  
 Analyses of variance were carried out utilising a 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interpreter) design 
with motivation, number of days spent away discussed, and percentage truth telling in the 
interview as dependent variables. The grand mean showed that the participants were 
motivated to perform well during the interview (M = 4.01, SD = .72 on a 5-point scale). The 
ANOVA revealed no significant main or interaction effects for motivation, all F’s < 3.37, all 
p’s > .067. Truth tellers discussed on average more days spent away in their interview (M = 
4.08, SD = 2.92, 95% CI [3.65, 4.52]) than liars (M = 3.03, SD = 1.21, 95% CI [2.59,3.46]), 
F(1, 200) = 11.38, p = .001, d = 0.46 (0.18,0.74). All the other effects were not significant, all 
F’s < 1.25, all p’s > .067. We included ‘the number of days spent away discussed’ as a 
covariate in the hypotheses testing analyses. We did not predict any effects for nationality of 
the participants. In addition, not only nationality but also interviewer and interpreter varied 
along with nationality. We wanted to control for the possible effects of this cluster of factors, 
and therefore included site as a covariate in the hypotheses testing analyses. 
Truth tellers told the truth significantly more (M = 97.45, SD = 8.67, 95% CI 
[94.21,100.63]) than liars (M = 14.20, SD = 21.73, 95% CI [10.86,17.28]) about the expected 
questions, F(1, 200) = 1311.18, p < .001, d = 4.96 (4.40,4.51). Truth tellers also told the truth 
significantly more (M = 98.42, SD = 4.23, 95% CI [95.11,101.64]) than liars (M = 18.98, SD 
= 23.48, 95% CI [15.58,22.12]) about the unexpected questions, F(1, 200) = 1140.68, p < 
.001, d = 4.64 (4.11,5.16). All the other effects were not significant, all F’s < 2.78, all p’s > 
.096. 
On average truth tellers made their trip made M = 5. 48 months prior to the interview 
(SD  = 2.96). This variable was not correlated with any of the main dependent variables in the 
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study (total details, complications, common knowledge details, self-handicapping strategies 
or proportion of complications), all r’s < .07, all p’s > .50). 
Hypothesis Testing 
 A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Interpreter) MANCOVA was conducted with the ten variables 
listed in Table 1 as dependent variables and preparation thoroughness, preparation time, site, 
and number of days spent away discussed during the interview as covariates.1 The analysis 
revealed significant main effects for Veracity, F(10, 187) = 5.597, p < .001, partial eta2 = 
.23) and Interpreter, F(10, 187) = 4.468, p < .001, partial eta2 = .19, and a significant 
Veracity x Interpreter interaction effect, F(10, 187) = 1.914, p =. 046, partial eta2 = .10. The 
univariate Veracity main effects are presented in Table 1. 
Tables 1 about here 
Compared to liars, truth tellers reported significantly more complications and fewer 
common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies2 when answering both the 
unexpected and expected questions. However, truth tellers and liars did not differ from each 
other in the total number of details they reported. Thus, Hypothesis 1a is supported, except 
for the variable total details.  In support of Hypothesis 1b, the proportion of complications 
was significantly higher for truth tellers than for liars in answering both the unexpected and 
expected questions. The difference in proportion scores between truth tellers and liars was 
similar in answering the unexpected questions (d = 0.67) and in answering the expected 
questions (d = 0.52), with a substantial overlap in the two 95% confidence intervals, rejecting 
Hypothesis 2 (but see below for differential effects for Interpreter absent and Interpreter-
present interviews).  
 Regarding the Interpreter main effect, significant univariate effects emerged for 
common knowledge details in answering both the unexpected, F(1, 196) = 9.124, p = .003, d 
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= 0.36 (0.08,0.64) and expected questions, F(1, 196) = 10.271, p = .002, d = 0.40 (0.12,0.68). 
In answering the unexpected questions, more common knowledge details were reported in 
Interpreter-absent (M = 1.14, SD = 0.91, 95% CI [0.99,1.31]) than in Interpreter-present 
interviews (M = 0.81, SD = 0.89, 95% CI [0.65,0.96]). The same pattern of results emerged in 
the answering the expected questions with more common knowledge details being reported in 
Interpreter-absent (M = 6.25, SD = 2.85, 95% CI [5.75,6.85]) than in Interpreter-present 
interviews (M = 5.08, SD = 2.88, 95% CI [4.49,5.58]). In Hypothesis 4 it was predicted that 
fewer details would be reported in Interpreter-present than in Interpreter-absent interviews. 
Since there was no difference in the number of details reported in Interpreter-present and 
Interpreter-absent interviews, Hypothesis 4 is rejected.  
Regarding the Veracity x Interpreter interaction effect, three significant univariate 
effects emerged. First, a significant effect for common knowledge details in answering 
unexpected questions emerged, F(1, 196) = 8.508, p = .004, partial eta2 = 0.04. In 
Interpreter-absent interviews, liars reported more common knowledge details in answering 
the unexpected questions (M = 1.65, SD = 0.80, 95% CI [1.46,1.93]) than truth tellers (M = 
0.65, SD = 0.71, 95% CI [0.39,0.84]), F(1, 95) = 38.135, p < .001, d = 1.30 (1.00,1.60). In 
Interpreter-present interviews, the difference between liars (M = 0.98, SD = 0.97, 95% CI 
[0.74,1.21]) and truth tellers (M = 0.62, SD = 0.75, 95% CI [0.38,0.87]) in reporting common 
knowledge details just failed to reach significance, F(1, 97) = 3.808, p = .054, d = .41 
(0.13,0.69). Note that this differential pattern of Veracity findings is caused by liars: They 
reported more common knowledge details in Interpreter-absent (M = 1.65) than in 
Interpreter-present interviews (M = 0.98); truth tellers reported the same number of common 
knowledge details in Interpreter-absent (M = 0.65) and Interpreter-present interviews (M = 
0.62). 
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 Second, a significant Veracity x Interpreter interaction effect for proportion of 
complications in answering unexpected questions emerged, F(1, 196) = 4.955, p = .027, 
partial eta2 = 0.032. In Interpreter-absent interviews, truth tellers (M = 0.74, SD = 0.28, 95% 
CI [0.65,0.80]) provided a higher proportion of complications in answering the unexpected 
questions than liars (M = 0.46, SD = 0.22, 95% CI [0.40,0.55]), F(1, 95) = 19.689, p < .001, d 
= 1.11 (0.80,1.39). In Interpreter-present interviews, truth tellers obtained a similar 
proportion of complications score in answering the unexpected questions (M = 0.69, SD = 
0.31, 95% CI [0.59,0.77]) as liars (M = 0.59, SD = 0.29, 95% CI [0.51,0.68]), F(1, 97) = 
1.907, p = .170, d = .33 (0.05,0.60). Note that in Interpreter-absent interviews the Veracity d-
score for proportion of complications for unexpected questions is substantially higher (d = 
1.11 [0.80,1.39]) than the earlier reported Veracity d-score for the proportion of 
complications for expected questions (d = 0.52 [0.23,0.79]). This supports in Interpreter-
absent interviews Hypothesis 2, that the proportion of complications variable would be most 
diagnostic in answering the unexpected questions. 
The combination of findings that (1) the total details variable did not discriminate 
between truth tellers and liars, and (2) the proportion of complications variable was most 
diagnostic in answering the unexpected questions (in interpreter-absent interviews), supports 
in interpreter-absent interviews Hypothesis 3 in which it was predicted that the proportion of 
complications variable would be more effective in discriminating between truth tellers and 
liars than the total details variable, particularly in answers to the unexpected questions..  
Third, a significant Veracity x Interpreter interaction effect for total details in 
answering the expected questions emerged, F(1, 196) = 6.037, p = .015, partial eta2 = 0.03. 
Neither of the two simple effects tests revealed Veracity differences, but the effects were in 
opposite directions, causing the interaction effect to be significant. In Interpreter-absent 
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interviews, no difference emerged in the number of details reported in answering the 
expected questions between truth tellers (M = 77.78, SD = 46.24, 95% CI [63.52,84.45]) and 
liars (M = 60.47, SD = 24.60, 95% CI [53.78,75.43]), F(1, 95) = 1.331, p = .252, d = 0.49. 
Also in Interpreter-present interviews, no difference emerged in the number of details 
reported in answering the expected questions between truth tellers (M = 74.10, SD = 36.92, 
95% CI [63.55,85.13]) and liars (M = 81.21, SD = 36.95, 95% CI [70.52,91.44]), F(1, 97) = 
0.772, p = .398, d = .27.  
Discriminant Analyses 
Table 2 about here 
 We conducted a series of discriminant analyses to distinguish between truthful and 
deceptive interviewees in the unexpected and expected questions. In all cases, the objective 
group belonging (truthful versus deceptive) was the classifying variable, with the number of 
reported details or the proportion of complications as predictors. We present the cross- 
validated ‘leave-one-out’ results. Cross-validation assesses the accuracy of a statistical model 
across different samples, an important step in generalisation (Field, 2009). Since we found 
differences between Interpreter-absent and Interpreter-present interviews in the analyses just 
described, we ran these analyses for the two interpreter conditions separately. 
 Interpreter-absent interviews.  
 Regarding Interpreter-absent interviews (Table 2a), significant discriminant functions 
emerged for the proportion of complications predictors in both the unexpected questions and 
expected questions analyses. In addition, the truth/lie classifications based on the proportion 
of complications predictor were more accurate when answering the unexpected questions 
(71.13% total accuracy) than when answering the expected questions (64.40% accuracy).  
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Total details emerged as a predictor in the expected questions analysis only, which was not 
predicted. However, further analyses showed that this finding was an artefact. When we 
examined the difference in reporting total details between truth tellers and liars in Interpreter-
absent interviews with an ANCOVA with Veracity as factor and preparation thoroughness, 
preparation time, site, and number of days spent away discussed during the interview as 
covariates, no significant effect emerged, F(1, 95) = 1.331, p = .252, d =  0.47 (0.06,0.85). 
Since the ANCOVA takes the covariates into account whereas the discriminant analysis does 
not, we can conclude that the significant effect was caused by the covariates. Indeed, the 
effect for the covariate number of days spent away discussed on reporting detail was 
significant, F(1, 95) = 15.506, p < .001, partial eta2 = .14. Thus, the proportion of 
complications was more effective in discriminating truth tellers from liars than total details, 
particularly when answering unexpected questions. This supports Hypothesis 3.  
 We also calculated several within-subjects measures because they allow for decision 
rules to be formulated. We designed three decision rules and tested their ability to 
discriminate between truth tellers and liars. All three decision rules relate to a cut-off score of 
.50. We believe that this is a logical turning point as scores > .50 indicate that the interviewee 
reported more cues of truthfulness (complications) than cues to deceit (common knowledge 
details and self-handicapping strategies) whereas scores < .50 indicate that the interviewee 
reported more cues to deceit than cues to truthfulness.    
 The first decision rule we tested was for the answers to the unexpected questions. We 
tested the decision rule “An interviewee is classified as a truth teller if his/her proportion of 
complications score  > .50 and classified as a liar if his/her proportion of complications score 
< .50 ”. This means that interviewees with a proportion of complications score of .50 were 
treated as inconclusives. This decision rule resulted for the unexpected questions in a 73.9% 
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correct classifications rate, with a high percentage of truth tellers (87.2%) classified correctly 
(13 inconclusives, 13% of the sample). When we used the same decision rule for the answers 
to the expected questions (9 inconclusives, 9% of the sample), we obtained a 70.7% accuracy 
rate, with a high percentage of liars (93.5%) classified correctly. Note that the high accuracy 
rates for truth tellers in the unexpected questions analysis means that many truth tellers 
obtained a high proportion of complications when answering unexpected questions. Similarly, 
the high accuracy rates for liars in the expected questions analysis means that many liars 
obtained a low proportion of complications when answering the expected questions.  
 Finally, we designed a decision rule that combined the unexpected and expected 
questions. Interviewees who obtained >.50 proportion-of-complications scores on both the 
unexpected and expected questions indices were classified as truth tellers, whereas 
interviewees who obtained  <.50 proportion-of-complications scores on both the unexpected 
and expected questions indices were classified as liars. This resulted in a high total accuracy 
rate (88.2%), with high accuracy rates for both truth tellers (84.0%) and liars (92.3%). 
However, n = 50 (50% of the sample) of the interviewees were treated as inconclusives.   
 Interpreter-present interviews.   
 Regarding interpreter-present interviews (Table 2b), no significant discriminant 
function emerged when either total details or the proportion of complications were included 
as predictors. However, significant discriminant functions emerged in two of the three 
analyses based on decision rules. The decision rule “An interviewee is classified as a truth 
teller if his/her proportion of complications score  > .50 and classified as a liar if his/her 
proportion of complications score < .50 ” resulted for the unexpected questions in a 63.2% 
correct classifications rate, with a relatively high percentage of truth tellers (78.7%) classified 
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correctly (16 inconclusives, 16% of the sample). When we used the same decision rule for the 
answers to the expected questions no significant discriminant function emerged.  
 Finally, we ran a discriminant analysis based on the decision rule that combined the 
unexpected and expected questions: Interviewees who obtained >.50 proportion of 
complications scores on both the unexpected and expected questions indices were classified 
as truth tellers, whereas interviewees who obtained  <.50 proportion of complications scores 
on both the unexpected and expected questions indices were classified as liars. This resulted 
in a 70.2% total accuracy rate. However, n = 56 (54% of the sample) interviewees were 
treated as inconclusives.   
Discussion 
 We found that unexpected questions were more effective for lie detection purposes 
than expected questions. Compared to expected questions, the unexpected questions resulted 
in more pronounced differences in speech content between truth tellers and liars and in a 
better ability to discriminate between them. These findings provide support for asking 
unexpected questions.  
 In our experiment the expected and unexpected questions referred to different aspects 
of a trip the participants allegedly made. The unexpected questions approach can also be used 
in different ways. For example, it can be used as a two-steps approach, with asking expected 
questions first followed by unexpected questions about the same aspect of the event. In that 
case, someone can examine the amount of additional information provided in the unexpected 
questions. Colwell et al., who used this approach, found that truth tellers provided more 
additional details than liars (Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman, & Fede, 2013). 
 In the present experiment we also found that, compared to liars, truth tellers reported 
more complications, fewer common knowledge details and fewer self-handicapping 
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strategies. As a result, the proportion of complications was higher for truth tellers than liars. 
This replicates Vrij, Leal, et al.’s (2017) new within-subjects measures approach of 
examining speech content and thus contributes to the robustness of this approach. However, 
we also found that these findings were affected by the absence or presence of an interpreter. 
Common knowledge details and the proportion of complications differentiated truth tellers 
from liars in Interpreter-absent interviews but not Interpreter-present interviews. The 
difference in findings was due to liars providing more common knowledge details in 
Interpreter-absent interviews than in Interpreter-present interviews. Interviewees have more 
opportunity to think during an Interpreter-present than during an Interpreter-absent interview 
because they can think when the interpreter translates their responses. Perhaps during this 
enhanced thinking time they fabricated details that made their replies less scripted.  
 The benefit of using within-subjects measures is that decision rules of how to classify 
truth tellers and liars can be developed. In the interpreter-absent interviews, we achieved high 
accuracy rates in correctly classifying truth tellers and liars based on decision rules, 
particularly when both unexpected and expected questions were taken into account (88.2% 
total accuracy rates), but this decision rule also led to many inconclusive results (50 out of 
101 interviewees were judged as inconclusive). Although practitioners in all likelihood would 
be disappointed with so many inconclusive results, we believe that treating a case as 
inconclusive is better than just guessing whether that person is telling the truth or lying. The 
benefit of introducing an inconclusive category is that it distinguishes between those 
inconclusive cases and the remaining cases. Our findings showed that investigators can be 
accurate in assessing the veracity status in these remaining cases.  
 We reasoned that examining complications, common knowledge details and self-
handicapping strategies would be more effective for lie detection purposes than examining 
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total details. We found exactly that. However, we did not expect that the variable total details 
could not discriminate truth tellers from liars at all, which is somewhat unusual in deception 
research (Vrij, 2008). In addition, we found no difference in providing detail between the 
Interpreter-absent and Interpreter-present interviews. This is also an unusual finding as in all 
experimental studies examining the effect of interpreters so far, it has been found that 
Interpreter-present interviews result in less information than Interpreter-absent interviews. 
One obvious explanation for the lack of findings for the total details variable in the current 
experiment is that our coding system was not sensitive enough to pick up differences in detail 
between experimental cells. For example, we did not count action details when they could be 
deciphered from the context of the sentence. For example, in the sentence ‘We went by car to 
Amsterdam’ we would not count the word ‘went’. We are aware of coding schemes were 
such action details are counted (e.g., Colwell, Hiscock, & Memon, 2002). We do not think that 
our coding scheme was not sensitive enough. We have used the same coding scheme in 
studies before and often found differences in detail between experimental cells (e.g., Ewens 
et al., 2017; Vrij, Leal et al., 2017; Vrij, Nahari, Isitt, & Leal, 2016). Also, in the drawings 
part of the current research project (Vrij et al., in press), the variable total details did 
distinguish truth tellers from liars, as truth tellers reported more new details (details not 
reported in an earlier part of the interview) than liars.  
 Although Interpreter-present interviews did not result in a loss of information (as was 
found in the previous interpreter based experiments), interpreter-present interviews resulted 
in fewer cues to deceit and made lie detection more difficult. These findings demonstrate the 
importance of examining the effect of having an interpreter present on eliciting information 
and cues to deceit, because findings obtained in interpreter-absent interviews cannot always 
be generalized to interpreter-present interviews.  
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 Two methodological issue merit attention. First, in the third unexpected question in 
the interview, participants were asked to describe anything unexpected that happened or did 
not go according to plan when organising the trip. It could be argued that some complications 
reported in answer to this question were not reported spontaneously but were directly queried. 
In another deception study, unexpected events (which is similar to complications) that were 
mentioned spontaneously and that were mentioned after being prompted were examined 
separately (Jundi, Vrij, Hope, Mann, & Hillman, 2013). Truth tellers reported more 
spontaneous and prompted unexpected events than liars. This suggests that complications 
differentiate truth tellers from liars both when they are reported spontaneously or after being 
prompted.  
 Second, in the experiment truth tellers were given the opportunity to prepare 
themselves. We gave then this opportunity to avoid creating a confound between veracity and 
preparation, as we also gave liars the opportunity to prepare themselves. Although asking 
truth tellers to prepare themselves increased the robustness of the experimental design 
someone may argue that this is not realistic as in real life truth tellers are unlikely to prepare 
themselves. We believe that the advantage of the experimental robustness outweighs this 
disadvantage, also because good interviewing involves giving interviewees plenty of 
opportunity to think about the event they are interviewed about (Fisher, 2010).  
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Table 1.  
Total detail, complications, common knowledge details, self-handicapping strategies and proportion of complications as a function of Veracity.  
 Truth 
M (SD) 95% CI 
Lie 
M (SD) 95% CI 
F p (two-tailed) Cohen’s d  
[95% CI] 
 
Unexpected (Planning of the 
trip) 
      
Detail 31.68 (20.87) (28.00,35.76) 32.22 (16.72) (28.11,35.88) 0.001 .971 0.03 (-.30,.24)  
Complications 3.48 (2.90) (2.90,3.98) 2.39 (2.29) (1.89,2.97) 6.101 .014 0.42 (.13,.69)  
Common knowledge details 0.64 (0.72) (0.46,0.80) 1.30 (0.95) (1.16,1.49) 29.883 < .001 0.79 (.49,1.05)  
Self-handicapping strategies 0.32 (0.55) (0.22,0.49) 0.63 (0.74) (0.46,0.73) 5.771 .017 0.48 (.19,.75)  
Proportion of complications 0.72 (0.30) (0.65,0.76) 0.53 (0.27) (0.48,0.59) 15.025 <.001 0.67 (.37,.94)  
Expected (Actual trip)       
Detail 76.03 (41.77) (67.23,82.24) 71.24 (33.15) (64.59,79.62) 0.216 .642 0.13 (-.14,.40)  
Complications 6.51 (7.38) (5.23,7.51) 3.78 (2.99) (2.75,5.03) 8.329 .004 0.48 (.20,.76)  
Common knowledge details 5.05 (2.80) (4.35,5.50) 6.26 (2.91) (5.83,6.99) 11.735 .001 0.42 (.14,.69)  
Self-handicapping strategies 0.17 (0.40) (0.08,0.30) 0.43 (0.65) (0.30,0.53) 7.226 .008 0.48 (.20,.75)  
Proportion of complications 0.46 (0.26) (0.41,0.51) 0.34 (0.20) (0.29,0.39) 10.793 .001 0.52 (.23,.79)  
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Table 2a  
Hit Rates for total detail and proportions of complications as a function of Veracity. Interpreter-absent interviews. 
 Hit Rate χ2 Wilks’ λ p-value Canonical correlation  
INTERPRETER-ABSENT Truths 
(%) 
Lies 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
    
 
Unexpected (Planning of the trip) 
Total detail  
Proportion of complications 
Expected (Actual trip) 
Total detail 
Proportion of complications 
 
Decision rules 
Proportion complications unexpected > .50 is 
truth teller, < .50 is liar and .50 is inconclusive 
Proportion complications expected > .50 is truth 
teller, < .50 is liar and .50 is inconclusive 
Proportion complications unexpected and 
expected combined (both process and outcome > 
.50 is truth teller, both process and outcome < .50 
is liar; others are inconclusive) 
 
 
---- 
75.0 
 
51.9 
61.5 
 
(n=47)  
87.2 
(n=46) 
47.8 
(n=25) 
84.0 
 
 
---- 
67.3 
 
79.6 
67.3 
 
(n=41)  
58.5 
(n=46)  
93.5 
(n=26) 
92.3 
 
 
---- 
71.3 
 
65.3 
64.4 
 
 
73.9 
 
70.7 
 
88.2 
 
 
00.165 
26.472 
 
05.312 
14.980 
 
 
22.570 
 
21.725 
 
42.973 
 
 
.998 
.764 
 
.948 
.859 
 
 
.768 
 
.784 
 
.412 
 
 
.684 
<.001 
 
.021 
<.001 
 
 
<.001 
 
<.001 
 
<.001 
 
 
.041 
.485 
 
.229 
.376 
 
 
.482 
 
.464 
 
.767 
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Table 2b  
Hit Rates for total detail and proportions of complications as a function of Veracity. Interpreter-present interviews.  
 Hit Rate χ2 Wilks’ λ p-value Canonical correlation  
INTERPRETER-PRESENT Truths 
(%) 
Lies 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
    
 
Unexpected (Planning of the trip) 
Total detail  
Proportion of complications 
Expected (Actual trip) 
Total detail 
Proportion of complications 
 
Decision rules 
Proportion complications unexpected > .50 is 
truth teller, < .50 is liar and .50 is inconclusive 
Proportion complications expected > .50 is truth 
teller, < .50 is liar and .50 is inconclusive 
Proportion complications unexpected and 
expected combined (both process and outcome > 
.50 is truth teller, both process and outcome < .50 
is liar; others are inconclusive) 
 
 
---- 
---- 
 
---- 
---- 
 
(n=47)  
78.7 
(n=45) 
---- 
(n=27) 
74.1 
 
 
---- 
---- 
 
---- 
---- 
 
(n=40)  
45.0 
(n=48)  
---- 
(n=20) 
65.0 
 
 
---- 
---- 
 
---- 
---- 
 
 
63.2 
 
---- 
 
70.2 
 
 
00.009 
02.911 
 
00.943 
02.817 
 
 
05.593 
 
02.998 
 
07.373 
 
 
1.00 
.971 
 
.991 
.972 
 
 
.936 
 
.967 
 
.847 
 
 
.925 
.088 
 
.331 
.093 
 
 
.018 
 
.083 
 
.007 
 
 
.009 
.169 
 
.097 
.166 
 
 
.253 
 
.181 
 
.391 
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1 We prefer this analysis above an analysis that included Type of Question as a within-subjects factor. Such a design would include a Type of 
Question main effect in which we were not interested. In addition, the Veracity main effect would not refer to Veracity effects in the unexpected 
and expected questions separately (the interesting analyses), but in Veracity effects overall, which are less specific and less interesting analyses. 
Thus, we would then also have to report the Veracity effects we report now. Finally, we believe that comparing the d-values for Veracity in the 
expected and unexpected questions to be a better way to test Hypotheses 2 and 3 than interpreting a significant interaction effect. A p-value 
provides information about the statistical relevance but not about the practical importance of an effect (Fritz, Morris, & Richler, 2012; du Prel, 
Hommel, Röhrig, & Blettner, 2009). In this article, we are interested in the practical relevance of the effect and d-values are indicators of 
practical relevance (Fritz et al., 2012).  
 
2 The SHS results refer to the number of self-handicapping strategies made. When we analysed how many truth tellers and liars reported self-
handicapping strategies we found that more liars (49%) than truth tellers (28.4%) reported self-handicapping strategies while answering the 
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process questions, X2(1, n = 204) = 9.195, p < .001, phi = .211. Also when answering outcome questions, more liars (35.3%) than truth tellers 
(15.7%) reported self-handicapping strategies, X2(1, n = 204) = 10.324, p < .001, phi = .225. 
